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RESERVATION OF LIFE INCOME AND POWER OF REVOCATION
NoT TESTAMENTARY WITHIN MoRTMAIN STATUTE A

settlor purported to set up a trust of certain of his property. In the trust agreement, the settlor reserved to himself the life income from the trust property,
with such further amounts from the principal as the trustee, in his absolute
discretion, should deem necessary for the settlor's proper maintenance and support; the power, with the approval of the trustee, to revoke or modify the
trust; and the life use of the realty encompassed by the trust, on which he
was to pay taxes. At the death of the settlor, certain of the trust property was
to be administered for specified charitable purposes. The Ohio mortmain
statute renders void a devise or bequest made to a charity by will executed
within one year of the testator's death.1 The alleged settlor died within one
year of the execution of the trust agreement. In an action for construction of
the trust agreement, the court of common pleas held that there was no completed gift by way of the trust since the so-called settlor did not sufficiently
part with dominion over the trust property, and that the disposition was testamentary in character. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the transfer
was fully consummated in the settlor's lifetime, and that therefore the mortmain statute did not apply. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio
also regarded the reservation of the interesti; in the settlor of merely divesting
significance and held that the decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio 1, 15 N. E. (2d) 627 (1938).

1
"If a testator dies leaving issue .•. and the will of such testator, gives ••. the
estate of such testator, or any part thereof, to ;i benevolent, religious, educational, or
charitable purpose . • • such will as to such gift • • . shall be invalid unless it was
executed according to law, at least one year prior to the death of the testator." Ohio
Gen. Code (Page, 1926), § 10504.
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When a settlor purports to set up a valid present trust, but reserves to himself for his lifetime certain aspects of control over the trust property, a question
arises as to whether the disposition is not in effect a testamentary one to be
treated as such. This question is answered differently in different types of
situations. Where such a trust is attacked on the basis that it is a testamentary
disposition not executed in compliance with the requirements of the statute of
wills, retention of a life income from the property, the power to revoke the
trust, and even-though here there is some conflict-the power to consume
the principal, have been held not to invalidate the trust.2 It is said that on the
execution of the trust agreement interests are presently created in the beneficiaries, though the enjoyment of those interests may be postponed until after
the settlor's death, or divested by the exercise of the power to revoke or consume.8 A similar problem is presented in the savings bank cases, where trusts of
savings accounts are often held to be non-testamentary dispositions through a
large measure of control is retained by the settlor during his life." The fact
that the savings account trust is a simple and often used method of disposing of
small estates without probate is probably a factor in those decisions refusing to
invalidate such trusts as testamentary and not in compliance with the wills
statutes. G On the other hand, under estate and inheritance tax laws, if a settlor
retains a life estate, or a power of revocation, the courts have held that this
renders the purported present transfer illusory, and that realistically the transfer
to the beneficiaries is one taking place at the settlor's death, and is taxable as
such. 6 The need to prevent avoidance of death duties by technically inter vivos
transfers where the transferor really retains control of the disposition of the
property until his death led the courts to place their decisions in the tax field on
the basis of the "shifting of economic benefits" rather than on concepts of vesting and divesting. 7 Whether the retention of substantial incidents of ownership in the trust property by a settlor should be held to render the transfer a
1 BocERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 103 et seq. (1935); 73 A. L. R. 209
(1931).
8 Goodrich v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 270 Mich. 222, 258 N. W. 253
(1935); 1 BocERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 103 et seq. (1935); 73 A. L. R.
209 (1931).
"Stockert v. Dry Dock Savings Inst., 155 App. Div. 123, 139 N. Y. S. 986
(1913); Bogert, "The Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits," 1 CoRN.
L. Q. 159 (1916); Rowley, "Living Testamentary Dispositions and the Hawkins
Case," 3 UNiv. CIN. L. REv. 361 at 378 (1929); 48 A. L. R. 189 (1927); 59
,A. L. R. 975 (1929).
5 Rowley, "Living Testamentary Dispositions and the Hawkins Case," 3 UNIV.
CIN. L. REV. 361 (1929).
6 Stimson, ''When Revocable Trusts Are Subject to an Inheritance Tax," 25
MICH. L. REV. 839 (1927); Rowley, "Living Testamentary Dispositions and the
Hawkins Case," 3 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 361 at 390 (1929); 38 YALE L. J. 657
(1929); 49 A. L. R. 864 (1927).
7 Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 S. Ct. 225 ( 1928); Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240
U. S. 625, 36 S. Ct. 473 (1916).
2
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testamentary one for the purposes of the mortmain statutes is an open question. 8
In the instant case, in holding that the retention of the life income, power to
consume the principal, and power to revoke did not render the trust an
attempted testamentary disposition, the court followed the wills cases rather
than the tax cases. In so doing, it repudiated ·the much commented upon 9
dictum of Union Trust Co. 'lJ. Hawkins 10 that in the absence of statute, the
mere reservation qf a power of revocation will render a trust testamentary.
This dictum stood alone,11 and its abandonment, bringing Ohio into line with
the large majority of cases which hold that the reservation of a power to revoke
is consistent with a valid present trust,1 2 seems warranted. Whether, when a
settler retains not only a power of revocation, but also life income and power to
consume the principal, the trust should be considered non-testamentary for the
purposes of the mortmain statute is not so clear. It is true, the use of the trust
device in lieu of a will is no argument against the use of the trust.18 Moreover,
the operation of the mortmain statutes can be avoided by an inter vivas transfer .14 But it is at least doubtful whether the courts should allow the circumvention of the mortmain statutes by the use of a trust in which so many incidents
of ownership are retained by the settler that the formally inter vivos transfer
is in a large sense testamentary.15

Benjamin H. Dewey
8 Scott, "Trusts and the Statute of Wills," 43 HARV. L. REV. 521 at 539 (1930).
See President of Bowdoin College v. Meritt, (D. C. Cal. 1896) 75 F. 480; Worthington v. Redkey, 86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N. E. 2II (1912).
9 Rowley, "Living Testamentary Dispositions and the Hawkins Case," 3 UNiv.
Cm. L. REV. 361 (1929); Scott, "Trusts and the Statute of Wills," 43 HARV. L.
REV. 521 at 533 (1930); Bogert, "Some Recent Developments in the Law of Trusts,"
23 ILL. L. REv. 749 at 756 (1929); Leaphart, "The Trust as a Substitute for a
Will," 78 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 626 at 630 (1930); 38 YALE L. J. u35 at II40

(1929).
10
121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N. E. 389 (1929).
11
73 A. L. R. 209 at 214 (1931).
12
1 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 103 et seq. (1935); 73 A. L. R. 209
(1931).
18
Scott, "Trusts and the Statute of Wills," 43 HARV. L. REv. 521 at 528
(1929); Leaphart, "The Trust as a Substitute for a Will," 78 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
626 (1930).
H See the instant case, 15 N. E. (2d) 627 at 630 (1938).
15
Scott, "Trusts and the Statute of Wills," 43 HARv. L. REV. 521 at 539
(1929).

